The Libyans Attitudes towards Democratic Transition
during the Period from 2012 to 2014
اتجاهات الليبيين نحو عملية التحول الديمقراطي خلال السنوات 2012–2014

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Abstract:

Libya has witnessed a democratic transition process since the early months of 17th February Revolution, 2011.However, aftereight years, there is still a gap in the literature about this topic. Thus, this study aims to fulfil a part of this gap by describing and analyzing the Libyan attitudes towards the democratic the transition process in Libya post Kaddafi era during the years, 2012-2014. Currently, the Libyans view themselves as participants in the democratic process that Libya is enjoying since August 2011, when the declaration of the liberating of Libyan was announced by the President ofthe Interim Transitional National Council "ITNC" in Benghazi. The findings of this study demonstrate that the Libyans are no longer view themselves as belonging to parochial or subjective political cultures; and therefore, the rate of registration on the 7thof July 2012 election reached 93%, whereas the ratio of the actual voting reached 65% of the total eligible voters. The negative attitudes towards Kaddafi's regime have changed into positive patterns after the victory of 7thFebruary Revolution. These positive attitudes towards participation culture are spilled over towards the new political system as well as its internal and external policies. Nevertheless, negative attitudes towards issues that threat the national identity have been reported as the majority of the participants rejected federalism as a political system for the new Libya. The findings also indicate that issues related to Amazigh language, liberal democracy and forgiveness with Kaddafi's supporters before the interim-justice takes place were also rejected by a large portion of the sample.

Keywords: ITNC, NPC, the Interim Constitutional Declaration, system attitudes, process attitudes, policy attitudes.

ملخص البحث:

شهدت ليبيا عملية انتقال ديمقراطي منذ الأشهر الأولى لثورة 17 فبراير 2011. وعلى الرغم من مرور ثمان سنوات على ذلك، إلا أن هناك ندره في الأدبيات المتعلقة بهذا الموضوع، وبالتالي فإن هذه الدراسة تهدف إلى تضييق هذه الفجوة من خلال وصف وتحليل الاتجاهات نحو عملية الانتقال الديمقراطي في ليبيا ما بعد القذافي خلال السنوات، 2012–2014.

وينظر الليبيون حاليًا إلى أنفسهم على أنهم مشاركون في العملية الديمقراطية التي تتمتع بها ليبيا منذ عام 2011، عندما قام رئيس المجلس الوطني الانتقالي المؤقت "ITNC" في مدينة بنغازي بالإعلان عن تحرير كامل التراب الليبي. وتبين نتائج هذه الدراسة، إلى حد كبير، أن الليبيين لم يعودوا يعتبرون أنفسهم ينتمون إلى كل من الثقافتين السياسيتين الرعوية والتابعة؛ لذلك بلغ معدل التسجيل في انتخابات 7 يوليو 2012 حوالي 93 ٪ ، وبلغت نسبة التصويت الفعلي في انتخابات عام 2012 أكثر من 65 ٪ من مجموع الناخبين المؤهلين لذلك. فلقد تغيرت المواقف السلبية إلى أنماط إيجابية عندما اندلعت ثورة 17 فبراير 2011 وبدأت عملية التحول الديمقراطي من خلال الانخراط في انتخابات 2012 والتسليم السلمي للسلطة. كما يلاحظ في هذا السياق أيضا انتشار أو امتداد الاتجاهات الإيجابية نحو ثقافة المشاركة إلي النظام السياسي الليبي الجديد وسياساته الداخلية والخارجية خلال السنوات 2011–2014. لكن يلاحظ في المقابل بروز اتجاهات سلبية خاصة نحو القضايا التي تهدد الهوية الوطنية، وبالتالي كانت غالبية العينة إما غير موافقة أو لا توافق بشدة على الفيدرالية كخيار سياسي لليبيا الجديدة، إلي جانب رفضه اللغة الأمازيغية كلغة رسمية، ومحاكاة الديمقراطية الليبرالية، والتسامح مع أتباع نظام القذافي قبل تحقق العدالة الانتقالية.

الكلمات الدالة: ITNC المجلس الوطني الانتقالي، NPC المؤتمر الوطني العام، الإعلان الدستوري المؤقت، الاتجاهات على مستوى النظام، الاتجاهات على مستوى العملية، الاتجاهات على مستوى السياسة.

Introduction:

Arab Spring revolutions in the North Africain particular, and in Arab World, in general, have changed the political map of the region. Accordingly, democratic transition processes have been witnessed in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya since 2011. Parliamentary and presidential elections were held in these countries along with the development of new constitutions in Tunisia and Egypt. However, other Arab countries like Morocco and Jordan made some preventive steps to avoid the impact of these revolutions, whereas excessive force has been used in Syria. The reasons behind the revolutions in these countries include lack of freedom, poor economic conditions and the interference of foreign countries (Salamey, 2012). The focus of this study is on the democratic transition process in the New Libya or post Kaddafi's Libya. On the 3rd of August 2011, the new Libya adopted a contemporary constitutional declaration that drew a road map towards democracy. It was supposed that by 2013, a permanent constitution should have been established and a new political system should have been functioning. As the Libyans are in the process of democratic transition, their attitudes towards this process represent the focus of politicians, scholars, civil society and global organizations. Thus, some of these attitudes will be investigated in this study.

Data and Methodology:

Methodologically, scientific studies describe and examine specific problems (Buchanan, 1988: 12-15). Review of the literature reveals that a political culture varies from one country to another (*Riggs, 1964; and Heady, 1974*). There are differences between political

culture of democratic nations and that of authoritarian regimes. Previous studies stressed that the Libyan people viewed themselves as belonging to parochial and subjective cultures. (Obeidi, 1996 & 2001) The national identity is weak and fragile, due to the political socialization that Kaddafi's regime attempted to impose on the Libyans since the *coupe d'état* in 1969 (Obeidi, 2001). And since the political regime has been changed in Libya in 2011, the problem of this study therefore addressed these two questions: *is there a change in the Libyan political culture in the post Kaddafi's era? if so, is the new political culture supportive for the ongoing democratic transition in the country?*

Accordingly, two hypotheses have been developed. While the basic hypothesis expect a causal relationship between the democratic transition on one hand, and attitudes towards democracy on the other hand (Cozby, 2003: 64-67), the null hypothesis does not expect that. Thus, the two hypotheses might be stated as follow:

- *The democratic transition in Libya is expected to affect the Libyan political culture either positively or negatively.*

- *The democratic* transition *in Libya is not expected to affect the Libyan political culture.*

While the democratic transition will be dealt with as an independent variable, political culture "attitudes" will be treated as a dependent variable. According to the previous hypotheses, this study will deal with both variables on three functional levels of analysis: system, process and policy (Almond, 1978). As far as the approaches, methods and techniques of this study are concerned, it should be emphasized that multi strategies plan is adopted utalizing empirical and normative approaches, descriptive and analytical methods, quantitative and qualitative techniques.

Regarding the data of this study, it should be mentioned that a questionnaire was developed in order to collect data that will enable us to examine the validity of basic and null hypotheses. The questionnaire included seven controlling variables, as well as forty-one questions or variables that reflect the three mentioned functional levels of analysis. The sample of the study was selected randomly, and the final responses were received by the end of 2012. The number of received responses was 1068 and were entered in the computer in order to examine the validity of the two hypotheses.

In order to control the relationship between the variables of this study, seven variables were incorporated in the questionnaire regarding: gender type, age, education, income, social status, occupation, and place of living. The sample was, to a large extent, representative for the

population in terms of the seven mentioned controlling variables. No significant differences were noticed on the macro-level of analysis, especially within the framework of the *total attitudes variable*. Nevertheless, significant minor differences were recorded on the micro-level of analysis, but they did not affect the overall positive attitudes towards the democratic transition in the new Libya, as it will be demonstrate later on.

According to the previous hypotheses, this study will be divided into the following sections:

- Libyan political culture in the new millennium,
- Democratic transition in the New Libya,
- The impact of democratic transition upon Libyan political culture,
- Conclusion: results.

Libyan Political Culture in the New Millennium:

Political culture, according to *Almond and Powell* (1978: 25) "is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings about political current in a nation at a given time." In this sense, political culture reflects three elements or levels: (Almond & Powell, 1978: 26)

- *Cognitive component*, which reflects individual knowledge about internal and external surrounding environmental conditions, such as, the political system, leaders, decision making process and its internal and external outputs. The Questionnaire of this study incorporated this element; therefore, answering the question require a minimum level of knowledge regarding the constitutional declaration, the 17th February revolution and its development, the interim period and the road map of democratic transition in Libya post-Kaddafi era.

- *Effective element* that involves peoples' orientations towards political system, political process and policy process. In this regard, the Likert's scales of measurement was adopted; and thus the ordinal level of measurement ranged from strongly disagree into strongly agree.

- *Evaluative dimension*, which consist of moral values that enable individuals to criticize, for example, the slow responses of political system to his or her demands. The evaluative aspects is also included in different questions, that required certain positions, such as criticizing internal or external policies that adopted by the contemporary Libyan government in post-Kaddafi era.

As far as Libyan political culture is concerned, review of the literature reveals that there is generally a huge gap in this regard. Due to the nature of Kaddafi's authoritarian regime (1969-

2011), negative feelings and opposition to his regime were treated as serious political crimes that end up either in a long span of prison or execution. Furthermore, the gap in the literature continued in the post Kaddafi's era, due to time factor and lack of scientific infrastructure. Despite the mentioned gap in the literature, one should mention the contribution of some scholars in this regard.

While one study focused on the process of political socialization in the elementary schools during the Kaddafi's era,(El-Mogherbi, 1978) others described and analyzed empirically the attitudes of a student sample towards: national identity, tribalism, political participation, women human rights, Arab unity and nationalism, and the Palestinianissue. The results of Obeidi's study reported negative attitudes towards tribalism and political participation on the one hand; and positive orientations towards Arabism, Islam, women rights, Arab nationalism, Arab unity, and the Palestinian case on the other hand.(Obeidi, 1996 and 2001)Since the case study is the method adopted by Obeidi's study; therefore, the generalization of her findings is limited.(see in this regard: Eckstein, 1975: 79-137; and Babbie, 2008:328)

There is also a recent survey conducted by the International Republic Institute "IRI" in the Eastern part of Libya, and its main finding reflected optimism towards the future of new Libya. The Survey of IRI interviewed a large sample (N=1428) in five different parts of Eastern Libya, and it concluded that economic preferences are the first priority among the majority (79%) of the individuals, who were included in the sample. Only, one third of the sample (33%) gave a priority to political and security situation in the new Libya. Furthermore, only half (49%) of the sample trust and support the Interim Transitional National Council "*ITNC*" that govern the country in the period (22 February,2011 to 8 August,2012) Even though the sample is considerable in terms of size, but it did not represent the entire population, particularly in the Western part of Libya, where the ratio of population reach 60% of the total Libyans. But, the IRI's survey were conducted during the period of revolution, thus it focused on the liberated eastern part of Libya.[3]

It is obvious, that the Libyan political culture was directed by the authoritarian regime during the Kaddafi's era, so political socialization of young generation was a major policy focus during the years (1969-2011). Furthermore, the Kaddafi's regime deemphasized the Libyan national identity on the one hand, and emphasized Arabism and then Africanism on the other hand, in order to be called the leader of Arab nationalism or "the king of the kings".

Furthermore, the Libyan people viewed themselves as parochial or subjective rather than participant, due to the lack of freedom and encouragement of tribalism by Kaddafi's regime.

Since liberty was the first slogan emphasized by the demonstrators in 17 February revolution, new attitudes towards the political system are expected to exist. Freedom of speech and media involvement in political life will support the levels of knowledge among Libyan citizens. Furthermore, the democratic transition that took place in the new Libya resulted in openness, optimism, trust and continuous dialogue among people, civil society, political parties and government. In short, political culture nowadays is more encouraged and fluorescent compared with the circumstances forty years ago.

Democratic Transition in the New Libya:

Review of the literature reveals that democracy requires a compatible set of values system, particularly economic development and political legitimacy, in order to make it endure. (see Seymour, 1959; Almond and Verba, 1963 and 1980) As far as the values system of democracy are concerned, it should be emphasized that traditions and customs, rather than Islam, have hindered in the past the Islamic countries from transferring into democracy. In a distinctive study, Tessler (2002) concluded that, "Islam and democracy are incompatible"

The lack of empirical studies, regarding democratic processes in the Arab world, is mainly due to the dominance of authoritarian and dictatorship regimes, and the spread of political development crises, (see for example: Huntington, 1971). In a unique study, Moreno (2002) find out that the prevailing political culture in Mexico reflected low levels of support for democracy, interpersonal trust and intolerance, versus high levels of support for non-democratic government and strong stress on deference, (Moreno 2002).

As far as Libya is concerned, review of the history reveals that Libya was a constitutional Monarchy in the period, 1951-to-1969, and a dictatorship regime during the years, 1969-to-2011. Therefore, many Libyans knew both types of governance in the last six decades. The interactive dynamic of religion, tribalism, oil and ideology shaped and affected the political processes in the past, and they are expected to do so in the future. (See in this regard, Sawani, 2012: 1-26) The democratic transition that Libya is enjoying in the post-Kaddafi era, is generally a first step in a long journey towards democracy, and thus government and people alike will face tremendous problems. Nevertheless, review of democratic transition processes in the new Libya is a prerequisite in this regard; therefore, we will follow up the steps that adopted by Libyan authorities towards democracy since the beginning of 17th of February 2011.

On the 3rd of August 2011, the ITNC, as a first step to build the new Libya according to democratic values and principles, announced a constitutional declaration. The constitutional declaration consists of 37 articles that govern the interim period on the one hand, and set up a road map to democratic transition in the new Libya on the other hand. In this regard, article (30) explained in details the processes of transforming Libya post Kaddafi's into a democratic country, in which the people determine their future and elect their government through ballot for the first time since the last fraud election in 1964-1965.

During the interim period, the *ITNC* was the supreme authority, and it succeeded in the process of managing the State until the National Public Conference *"NPC"* was elected on the 7th of July 2012, and exercised power since the 8th of August 2012. The election of the *"NPC"* was several weeks behind the schedule that determined by the road map, mainly due to political and logistical management problems.

The *ITN C* appointed, during the period of the revolution until the day of declaring the liberation of Libyan soil on the 23rd of October 2011, an interim executive office in order to manage the crisis during the revolutionary era. After the liberation of Libya, an interim government established in order to prepare for a second phase of democratic transition by holding the first election since 1964-1965. When the *NPC* resumed power on the 8th of August 2011, it elected a contemporary government that will prepare for takeoff towards building the state of law and institutions.

Although the Constitutional declaration gave Power for the *NPC* to formulate the constitutional draft and submit it on the 8th of September 2012, later developments led the *ITNC* to amend the constitutional declaration for second time on March, 2012, when it mentioned that a committee of sixty will be chosen from the NPC. In the third amendment, the *ITNC* decided on the 5th of July 2012 that the committee of sixty will be elected directly from the Libyan people; therefore, it will be equivalent to the NPC in terms of legitimacy and power, since they are both elected directly by people. Finally, the fourth amendment regarding the extending period of democratic transition was declared by *NPC* in late 2012, because of disagreement among its members, who split in their views between electing and appointing the committee of sixty. Finally, the *NPC* decided in mid-February 2013 that the election is the rational choice for the committee of sixty; therefore, the necessary measures was taken in order to fulfill this goal.[4] Despite the delay in the process of democratic transition, due to political and security reasons,

the Constitutional Declaration of 2011 spelled out the process of making the permanent constitution by stated that: (the Constitutional Declaration, 2011: Article 30/2)

> *The constitution draft shall be approved by the National Public Conference, and shall be referred to the people for a plebiscite with (Yes) or (No) within thirty days from the date of the approval thereof by the Conference. If and when the Libyan people approve the Constitution by two thirds of the majority of the voters, the Constitutional Power shall then approve the constitution draft as being the Constitution for the State. The National Public Conference shall also approve the same. In case of disapproval of the Libyan people, the Constitutional Power shall then be assigned to reformulate the constitution draft and the constitution draft shall be re-referred to the people for a plebiscite within a period not exceeding thirty days.*

Another task of the *NPC* is to prepare for general election in the late 2013; and thus the Law of public elections was issued by late 2012. The constitutional declaration emphasized that both the *NPC* and the interim elected government "*shall oversee the preparation of all the requirements of conducting the election process in a democratic and transparent manner.*" (see the Constitutional Declaration, 2011)

The High National Election Commission, which shall be reformed by the *NPC*, shall conduct the public elections under the supervision of the National Judicial Authority, the United Nations and the international and regional organizations. Accordingly, the *NPC* shall ratify and declare the outcomes of the elections, and shall convoke the Legislative Authority for meeting by the end of 2013. In the first session thereof, the *NPC* shall transfer its powers to the new Libyan parliament, which shall exercise its full Power.

By holding the first session of the Legislative Power or the new Libyan parliament in the late 2013, the current Interim Government led by Ali Zed an shall be deemed and taken as a caretaker government for conducting business until a new permanent government is appointed in accordance with the new Constitution. The new constitution is not expected only to widen the scope of human rights and select the best political system that reflect the surrounding environmental conditions, but it will be also a vehicle to national reconciliation. (Rajabany, 2013).

Obviously, the process of democratic transition in the new Libya is not smooth, as it seems to be, due to internal and external factors as well. The literature identified religion, tribalism, oil, and ideology (Sawani, 2012), as well as short history of political unity, artificial

and long borders, and the division of population on sectarian, ethnic and regional lines, (Gause, 2012) as main factors that affect democratic transition and the political future of Libya post-Kaddafi. The previous factors, among other things, e.g. the spread of weapons, violence and foreign intervention, are additional elements will affect certainly democratic transition and political future of the new Libya. The external factor was prominent during the 17 February revolution, and it will continue to do so in the present and the future as well. (For more details on the role of external factor in the Libyan spring revolution (*Kashiem, 2012: 556-570*).

The Impact of Democratic Transition upon Political Culture:

As mentioned earlier, basic and null hypotheses will be examined in this section. In order to do so, the data of this study will be described and analyzed statistically on two levels:

- Macro Level, Micro level.

Macro Level Analysis:

In this level of analysis, we will deal with attitudes towards democratic transition as whole; therefore, the frequencies will be added together in order to create new variables. In this regard, four variables will be developed as follow:

- The forty-one questions of the questionnaire will be dealt with as one major variable named "*total or general attitude*"; therefore, the frequencies of the forty-one variables will be added together in order to analyze it statistically as a whole.

- Furthermore, the forty-one questions will be also dealt with according to the three functional levels of political culture that emphasized by *Almond and Powell* (1978), thus we will call them: attitudes towards political system or "*system attitude*"; attitudes towards political process or "*process attitude*"; and finally attitudes towards policies or "*policy attitude variable*".[5]

In order to analyze the data on the macro level, Tables: 1 and 2 were developed. The data of Table: 1 demonstrates that the sample had positive attitudes as far as the four variables are concerned. It is obviously, that the means of the four variables are bigger than the test values indicated in Table: 2. While the test value of *total attitudes variable* that includes forty-one questions equal (*123*), the data of Table: 1 indicates that the mean (*281.116*) exceeded the test value noticeably by (*158.116*).[6]

But, when we break down the *total attitudes* variable into three sub-variables, the differences among the test values and means are less noticeable, especially in the case of

process variable where the difference did not exceed (3.592). However, the macro level analysis does not enable us to explain whether or not there are divergent attitudes in this regard, a matter will be explored more later on in the micro-analysis sub-section.

Furthermore, the data of Table-1 shows the values of standard deviations with a maximum value in case of *total attitude* variable (21,44), and minimum value in case of *process attitudes* variable (3.93). Since the higher the standard deviation, the less tightly the values are clustered around the mean; therefore 99.9% of the cases will lie within three standard deviations and above. While the mean in the case of *total attitude* variable is 281.116, and the standard deviation is 21.441, thus it might be indicated that 99.9% of the cases will lie within 259.675 and 302.557.

Means and standard deviations, however, do not tell us the whole story. Thus, the data of Table: 2 indicate that the mean difference (158.116) is higher than the test value (123), which represents the normal attitudes towards democratic transition in the new Libya. Thus, the patterns of attitudes as a whole are positive, as far as the democratic transition in the new Libya is involved. Further analysis of data indicate that the positive attitudes towards democratic transition in the new Libya might be supported from the "t" value, which is considerably high in the case of *total* (t = 241) and *system* (t = 102.7) attitudes variables in particular, and *policy* (t = 63.2) and *process* (t = 29.9) variables in general.

The levels of significance that indicated in Table: 2 tell us also how the sample of the study (n=1067) represents the attitudes of Libyan public opinion towards democratic transition in the second decade of the twenty-first century.[7] Thus, levels of significance less than (p <0.05) lead us to accept the basic hypothesis on the one hand, and reject the null hypothesis on the other hand.[8] Further statistical tests regarding controlling the impact of attitudes on democratic transition is done, in order to investigate the influence of variables such as: gender type, age, education, income, social status, occupation, and place of living.

Table: 1* Means and Standard Deviations

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Total Attitudes	1068	281.11676	21.4411863	0.65608965
System Attitudes	1068	87.0763109	7.6627723	0.23447702
Process Attitudes	1068	33.5921348	3.93010321	0.12025921
Policy Attitudes	1068	39.77603	5.05642635	0.15472413

Data Source: A Questionnaire was delivered nationally by the author during 2012-2013.

Table: 2 One Sample Test

Variables					95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
	Test Value = 123					
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Lower	Upper
Total Attitudes	240.999	1067	0.000	158.1168	156.8294	159.4041
	Test Value = 63					
System Attitudes	102.681	1067	0.000	24.0763	23.6162	24.5364
	Test Value = 30					
Process Attitudes	29.870	1067	0.000	3.59213	3.3562	3.8281
Policy Attitudes	63.184	1067	0.000	9.77603	9.4724	10.0796

Data Source: Same as Table: 1.

Obviously, there are no significant differences reported on the macro-level of analysis. Nevertheless, significant differences ($p > 0.05$) were recorded regarding the *system, process and policy* variables among the three region of Libya, particularly between the west on one side, and the east and south on the other side. But, there is no significant differences reported within the framework of *total attitude variable* as far as regionalism is concerned. Further significant differences were reported regarding the occupation variable, where the attitudes of students and employees varied as far as *total, system and process variables* are concerned. But, significant differences between those who involved in high schools, colleges and universities were limited to the *process variable*.

Significant variations were further reported between singles and married respondents on the *system, process and policy* levels. Significant differences were also recorded between younger and older generations on the macro-level as a whole on the one hand, and between education levels and *total* and *system* variables on the other hand. Since the affective level of political culture involved in this study; therefore, some of the sample's respondents were either agree or strongly agree. Accordingly, the levels of supports are not necessarily identical in all cases; thus, significant differences were reported in the macro and micro-levels as well. But, significant differences on the macro-level do not tell us the whole story; therefore, we will explore more of that at the micro-level of analysis in the next sub-section.

Micro-Level Analysis:

The macro-level of analysis did not tell us about the issues that might be rejected totally, moderately or partially by the sample's members. Thus, the focus of this sub-section will shift from macro into micro level of analysis, in order to know what type of cases that reflect divergent attitudes. In this regard, the forty one questions or variables will be dealt with individually, so we can classify the most divergent from the coherent ones.

The statistical analysis of data on the micro-level of analysis showed that only six variables reflected, by and large, negative attitudes (see Figure: 1). The means of these six variables are less than the test value or (3); therefore, the data of Figure: 1 indicated that the general attitudes of the sample refused to classified themselves as adherent to subjective and parochial cultures. Furthermore, the general attitudes of the sample oppose federalism, tolerance with Kaddafi's supporters unless they are represented to justice, Amazigh as a formal language, and the adaptation of liberal democracy without adopting it to the Libyan environmental conditions.

But further statistical analysis, as indicated in Table: 3, demonstrated that the mean differences are varied from one variable to another; thus the larger mean differences, the more negative attitudes towards issues that related to the democratic transition in the new Libya. The level of negative attitudes in the sample was less than the tested value (3); therefore, one can conclude that six different cases regarding democratic transition were rejected by the sample's members.

In order to confirm the previous conclusion, we should investigate the "t" values and the level of significance as shown in Table: 3. The big "t" value indicated that the difference between the average means and the test values is considerable on the one hand, and the level of significances is less than 0.05 ($p > 0.05$) on the other hand. The "t" values is the highest in cases related to subjective culture (-31.4543), parochial culture (-27.9606) and federalism (-20.8458), respectively. This means that the attitudes towards such issues is less than the average mean or the tested value, and below the accepted level of significance ($p > 0.05$); therefore, we can conclude that the general attitudes towards democratic transition in the new Libya is positive, with the exception of these five issues:

- SubjectiveCulture
- ParochialCulture
- Federalism
- Tolerance with Kaddafi'sSupporters
- AmazighLanguage

Figure : 1 Means and Standard Deviations on the Micro-Level of Analysis

	Subjective Culture	Parochial Culture	Federalism	Kaddaf's Spporters	Amazigh Language	Liberal Democracy
■ Mean	1.978	2.027	2.159	2.804	2.818	2.927
▢ St. Deviation	1.062	1.137	1.319	1.264	1.388	1.295

Data Source: Same as Table: 1.

Table: 3 "T" test and Level of Significance: Micro-Level Analysis

	Test Value =3 T	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Conf. Upper	Lower
LiberalDemocracy	-1.84206	1067	0.066	-0.073	-0.15076	0.004761
AmazighLanguage	-4.29349	1067	0	-0.18234	-0.26567	-0.09901
Kaddafi'sSupporters	-5.05785	1067	0	-0.19559	-0.27147	-0.11971
Federalism	-20.8458	1067	0	-0.84105	-0.92022	-0.76189
ParochialCulture	-27.9606	1067	0	-0.97311	-1.0414	-0.90482
SubjectiveCulture	-31.4543	1067	0	-1.02262	-1.08641	-0.95882

Data Source: Same as Table: 1.

A further split issue regarding the democratic transition is reported, when the question of selecting the best political regime for the new Libya is answered by the sample's respondents. Figure: 2 shows that no agreement on a political system was reported; therefore, while the presidential system was a first priority for more than one quarter (29%) of the respondents, the Assembly (21%), parliamentary (18%) and the mixed presidential- parliamentary system (14%) were selected as a second, third and fourth best available political systems for the new Libya, respectively. Nevertheless, a considerable portion of the respondents were confused about the question of best available political systems for the new Libya; thus, 18% of them they were either not sure about the best political system for Libya (5%), or they did not answer the question in the first place due to their lack of knowledge in this regard (13%). The split attitudes

towards the available political systems for the new Libya are mainly due to the low level of cognition on the one hand, and the impact of political Islam which adopt strongly a different model of political system on the other hand. Many respondents argued that they would prefer Islamic political system instead of contemporary political systems that emphasized by the questionnaire of this study.

Figure: 2 Attitudes towards the Available Political Systems for the New Libya

Data Source: Same as Table: 1.

By the end of the micro-level section, we will attempt to describe and analyze the impact of other variables upon the attitudes towards democratic transition in the new Libya. As far as the impact of controlling variables is concerned on the micro-level of analysis, it is noticeable that significant differences were reported as follow:

1. T-test for equality of means showed that male are significantly different ($p > 0.05$) in their attitudes towards democratic transition in the new Libya in nine different cases: legitimacy, political parties pluralism, judiciary independence, Amazigh language, conciliation, policy of buying weapons, policy of reconstruction, rotation of power, and Kaddafi encouragement of tribes versus tribes. The levels of support were higher among females in four issues: legitimacy, Amazigh language, policy of reconstruction, and the encouragement of tribalism. But, the males were more supportive to the other five cases: parties' pluralism, judiciary independence, conciliation, policy of buying weapons, and rotation of power.

2. Different levels of support were recorded between students and employees at acceptable level of significance ($p > 0.05$) regarding twenty three issues: obedience, support, technocrat, constitution, citizens welfare, Islam, freedom of religions, parties pluralism, rotation of power, international obligation, private ownership, judiciary independence, parochial and subjective cultures, tribalism, Amazigh language, conciliation, tolerance,

disarmament, injured revolutionaries, reconstruction policy, re-evaluation of foreign policy towards Africa, Russia and China.

3. The ratio of issues that reflect significant differences reached its pike within the framework of *regional variable*; therefore, twenty nine cases (or 70%) reflected different patterns of attitudes among the respondents from western, Eastern and southern parts of Libya. The most prominent issues that reflect significance differences (at level of.000) are: obedience, support, legitimacy, technocrat, federalism,[9] parochial and subjective cultures, and disarmament. Nevertheless, crucial issues did not report significant differences, particularly in cases of national cohesion, participation culture and political tolerance.

4. The attitudes towards democratic transition according to education levels (high school and university levels), indicated that eight issues were statistically significant ($p > 0.05$), and they are: parochial and subjective cultures, support, disarmament, citizen welfare, liberty and equity, Islam, and human rights.

5. Singles and married respondents are significantly varied in their attitudes towards democratic transition on one third of the cases that incorporated in the questionnaire. These issues represented the three functional levels of political culture, and they are: obedience, legitimacy, technocrat, constitution, citizens' welfare, freedom of religion, rotation of power, international obligation, judiciary independence, parochial and subjective cultures, tribalism, disarmament, and re-evaluation of Libyan foreign policy.

6. The data of this study emphasized also a generation gap in more than one third of the issues at significant level ($p > 0.05$), and they are include: Support, technocrat, pluralism, Rotation of powers, international obligations, human rights, private ownership, judiciary independence, parochial and subjective cultures, tribalism, conciliation, middle class role in the revolution, disarmament, rebuilding Libya, and re-evaluation of Libyan foreign policy.

7. Finally, significant differences ($p > 0.05$) according to the income variable were reported between the different levels of income generally, and zero and high incomes respondents particularly, in the following cases: obedience, support, rotation of power, parochial and subjective cultures and tribalism.

By the end of this sub-section, the qualitative aspects of the previous statistical analysis should be mentioned. As far as the positive attitudes towards democratic transition in the new Libya are concerned, one might contribute that to the following factors:

1. The new Libya adopted since the early months of the 17th of February a constitutional declaration that recognized the rights and duties of Libyans in a democratic country; therefore, the Libyans involved for the first time since 1969 in real political processes that recognize their rights and duties as good citizens. This new shifts in political process resulted in different political attitudes that make citizens feel they are worthy and they can make differences in real political life.

2. Since Libya become a new democratic political system during the years 2011-2015; therefore, people do not view themselves belonging any more to parochial or subjective cultures, but rather they regard themselves as good citizens and participants in every aspect concerning the new Libya.

3. People can make the differences in democratic political system rather than authoritarian regime; thus, people support by nature democracy and reject dictatorship, and in this regard Libyans are not an exception to this rule.

4. Since political culture involves the levels of cognition, effectiveness and evaluation, it is noticeable that globalization and the revolutions in communications and information influenced and changed attitudes in favour of overthrown dictatorship and support democracy, and the Libyan people are not an exception to these changes. The media called the Youths, who communicate through the social networks in the spring revolutions countries, the generation of Face book, Twitters and You Tube.

5. The new political system that indicated by the constitutional declaration is a new option for Libyan people; therefore, their attitudes until now are positive and creative. The positive political attitudes in post Kaddafi's era are spilled over, but it is not necessarily will continue to do so, if the new political elites and leaders violate consistently democratic values and principles.

But, as we noticed that the sample's attitudes were negative towards matters that affect democratic transition in the new Libya, especially issues that affect their role as active citizens in politics, e. g. parochial and subjective cultures; or questions that affect national identity and unity, e.g.; federalism, tolerance with Kaddafi's supporters before they punished for their crimes and Amazigh language. Although these negative attitudes did not affect the overall patterns of *total or general attitudes*, but they might be contributed to the following reasons:

1. When the Kaddafi's regime suppressed the will of Libyan people during the years, 1969-to-2011, they viewed themselves as parochial and subjective. Now, the Libyans enjoying democracy; therefore, they view themselves as good citizens and active participants in the political process that will establish a new entity governed by law and institutions. This shift in Libyan political attitudes resulted in positive attitudes towards democratic transition, and negative orientations towards parochial and subjective cultures.

2. Although separatist or federalist movement represent a minority in the Eastern part of Libya, most of the sample rejected federalism as a political option for the new Libya, on the ground that Libyans are more homogeneous and shares history and values that should keep them cohesive and unified rather than disintegrated.

3. The Amazigh language is also rejected by a large portion of the sample, simply because the Amazigh constitutes a small portion of the population on the one hand (less than 10%), and the people are more open to learn foreign language, e. g., English, that upgrade and improve their skills for job market on the other hand.

4. Some of Kaddafi's supporters used every available means to suppress the revolution of 17th of February 2011, and they did not punished yet for their crimes against humanity, due to political and security reasons; therefore, the general attitudes refused to tolerate with them unless the justice take its course.

5. Liberal democracy is a successful model in the western countries, but it is not necessarily a good model for the new Libya; thus the general attitudes reject it, due the different environment conditions that distinguish one political system from another. So, it is not the democracy that was rejected by the majority of the sample, but copied liberal democracy as a model is what opposed by the sample majority.

Conclusion:

The aim of this study is to narrow down the gap in the literature regarding the status of political culture in the new Libya. The post-Kaddafi's Libya transferred from dictatorship into new democracy that reflected the outcomes of what is being known the Arab spring revolutions. Three revolutions resulted in the collapse of authoritarian regimes and the spread of the fourth wave of democracy in our contemporary world. Thus, the second decade of the new millennium ended the era of Kaddafi's dictatorship that last more than four decades (1969-to-2011) on the

one hand, and witnessed the beginning of democratic transition in the new Libya on the other hand. [10]

As far as the results of this study are concerned, one might summarize them in the following points:

1. The authoritarian regime suppressed the freedom of Libyan people since the *coup d'état* of 1969, when Kaddafi's came to power. The Kaddafi's regime involved in extensive political socialization processes that affected negatively the different functional levels of Libyan political culture. [11]

2. The new Libya is involved in a democratic transition process since the beginning of 17th of February revolution of 2011; therefore, a road map was adopted by the constitutional declaration of August 3rd of 2011. Accountable and transparent election was held in 7-7-2012, and adopting a permanent constitution is underway.

3. Libyan attitudes towards democratic transition reflected generally positive aspects on the macro and micro-levels of analysis as well.

4. Libyan attitudes have shifted from parochial and subjective cultures that were dominant during the Kaddafi era, into participation culture after the victory of the 17th of February revolution.

5. National identity becomes the first priority in Libya post Kaddafi.

6. The Libyan positive attitudes towards democratic transition are not obsolete; therefore, negative orientations were recorded when parochial and subjective cultures, national identity, liberal democracy, federalism and the necessity for transitional justice are involved.

7. Positive and negative attitudes towards democratic transition in the new Libya are not necessarily identical; thus, different levels of support and opposition were reported on macro and micro-levels alike.

8. There were no significance differences noticed when the seven variables controlled (gender type, age, education, income, social status, occupation, and place of living.) on the macro level of analysis.

9. There were significant difference recorded on the micro level of analysis as far as gender type, age, education, income, social status, occupation, and place of living variables are concerned, mainly due to the various levels of support among the respondents of the sample.

10. The democratic transition that Libya post Kaddafi enjoys is not the only variable that resulted in the new positive political orientations; therefore, further studies to explore that is required.

The previous findings support, by and large, the underlying basic hypothesis on the one hand, and reject the null hypothesis on the other hand. A positive relationship between democratic transition in the new Libya on the one side, and attitudes on the other side were supported by the data of this study. Nevertheless, systematic and consistent empirical studies are now in great demands, in order to describe and analyze scientifically the developments and changes in Libya and other Arab spring countries as well. [12]

Notes:

** This study summarizes the findings of a book published in Arabic by the author in 2013. (see the references of this study: خشيم، 2013) Thus, the main aim of this study is to inform the non-Arabic readers about the Libyans attitudes towards democratic transformation in the early years of Libya post-Kaddafi, 2011-to-2014.

1- The Yemeni revolution of 2011 did not fulfil its ultimate goals, when the Gulf Council States reached an agreement with Ali Abdalla Salah, the ex-president of Yemen; thus he stepped down and his vice president took over the power. The ex-president Ali Abdalla Sahah remained, however, in Yemen; therefore, his loyalists slowed down the process of political reforms that Yemeni's peoples hoped for during their revolution in 2011-to-2012.

2- The questions of the survey were classified according to the three functional levels of political culture as follow:

- System attitudes level included twenty one questions regarding: obey the government or obedience, support the government, legitimacy of government, performance of government, Libyan identity versus others, the length of transitional period, government of technocrats, political tolerance, liberal democracy, Libya as a country of law and institution, citizens welfare, liberty equity and justice, Islam as source of legislation, freedom of religions, political parties pluralism, rotation of power, international relations commitments, human rights, private ownership, judiciary independence, and federalism as a political choice for the new Libya.

- Process attitudes level incorporated ten questions related to: parochial culture, subjective culture, participation culture, Libya as one tribe, Kaddafi encouragement of tribes versus tribes, national reconciliation, Amazigh language, the role of middle class on 17th of February revolution, national conciliation with the last regions that supported Kaddafi, e.g., Sirit and Bani Walid, and tolerance with Kaddafi's supporters.

- Policy attitudes level included also ten questions regarding: policy of disarmament in Libya, policy of buying weapons, policy of medical treatment for injured revolutionary youths, policy of reconstruction, policy of services improvements, policy of reconciliation, policy of environment, re-evaluate Libyan foreign policy towards Africa, re-evaluate Libyan foreign policy towards Russia, China and Algeria, and policy of rewarding countries that participated in the alliance against Kaddafi's regime during the 17th of February revolution on 2011, e.g., France, USA and United Kingdom.

3- for more details on this subject, see: "Survey of Public Opinion in Eastern Libya, October 12-25, 2011, **Shabakat Corporation**, retrieved from: <http://www.shabakat.se>

4- The committee of sixty reflected the political bargaining process during the era of Libyan independence on 24-12-1952, when Libya divided into three states, namely Barka, Fazan and Tripoli. Each state represented by twenty delegates; therefore it called on this basis the committee of sixty. After sixty years from the Libya independence in 24-12-1951, the political elites duplicate the same political process regarding the new constitution. The committee of sixty reflects a controversial political issue among supporters and opponents in the new millennium, because many things had changed, e.g., the population has increased from one into more than six millions. The committee of sixty involves, however, the phenomenon of power sharing in the new democratic Libya, and thus "calls for power sharing system [in Libya] are gaining momentum". For more details on this committee, see for example: (Geha and Doumit, 2012)

5- While the system attitude variable will includes the total frequencies of the first twenty-one questions that reflect orientations towards the new Libyan political system; the other ten questions will represent the process attitude; and the final ten questions will refer to the policy attitude variable.

6- This study adopted Likert's five scales of measurement,(see Babbie, 2008: 188-189) thus the answers on the questions of this study questionnaire will reflect these five values: strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), do not know (3), agree (4), and strongly agree (5). Since the test value for the Likert'sscale of measurement on micro level is (3); therefore, the test value for the new developed variables, on the macro-level of analysis, will be calculated as follow: total attitudes (41 questions x 3 = 123); system attitudes (21 x 3 = 63); process attitudes (10 x 3 = 20); and finally policy attitudes (10 x 3 = 20). Accordingly, while figures below these test values refer to negative attitudes, higher values demonstrate positive attitudes. In short, the higher the values that recorded by questionnaire respondents according to Likert's scale of measurement, the more positive attitudes are reported.

7- The high levels of significance that indicated in Table: 2 are mainly due to the strong relationship and large number of cases as well.

8- In order to avoid type one error, by rejecting null hypothesis and it is true, the acceptable level of significance should be less than the acceptable level (p > 0.05)that is known in the literature. The data of Table: 2 demonstrates that the levels of significance is generally less than 0.01; therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and accept in the meantime the basic one, which assumed the impact of democratic transition upon the Libyan attitudes.

9- Although the first call for federalism during the 17th of February revolution, 2011 was from the eastern Libya (Barka's declaration), the data of this study indicated that the respondents from the southern Libya were noticeablysupportive to federalism. While the level of agreement among the respondents from the south reached (40.7%), this level did not exceed (21.5%) in the East and 13.7% in the west.

10- According to Huntington (1991), the contemporary world witnessed three waves of democracy. By the end of first decade in the twenty-one century, one might argue that the Arab spring revolutions represent the fourth wave of democracy.

11- In order to remain in power, Kaddafi did all he can to end the international embargo against his regime. Italy during Berlusconi era concluded on 2008 a treaty with Kaddafi regimeinvolved political and economic cooperation, and for further information in this regard see the author: (Kashiem, 2010)

12- Although the concept of Arab spring refers to the geo-political changes that occurred in the Arab world since the 2010, some analyst misread the dramatic changes in the region and considered the Arab spring concept as misleading, simply because it means for him replacing the Arab national identity with the Islamic identity.(for more details, see Bannerman, 2013) Observers can notice that the rise of political Islam in the Arab spring countries does not means the end of history; therefore, secularism versus political Islamism will continue even though Muslim brotherhood formed practically the first governments in Tunisia and Egypt as well.

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The questionnaire of this study was written in Arabic,simply because Arabic is the first working language in Libya. The delivery of the questionnaire based on the snowball sample technique, due to security and logistic reasons. The responses represented, largely, the Libyan population in terms of age, sex, occupation, place of living, education level, social status and income.

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الاستبيان

سيتم استخدام هذا الاستبيان لغرض علمي بحث، وبالتالي فإن تعاونكم مطلوب جدا حتى يمكن الاستفادة من ذلك في بناء ليبيا الجديدة. ونظرا لعلمية هذا الاستبيان، فإن البيانات الشخصية (مثل الاسم) غير مطلوبة. وبالرغم من أهمية الإجابة على كل أسئلة الاستبيان، إلا إنه يمكن عدم الإجابة على بعض الأسئلة في حالة عدم الارتياح لها. والله يوفقنا جميعا لخدمة ليبيا الجديدة, والله ولي التوفيق.

ملاحظة: يرجى الكتابة في خلف صفحات الاستبيان في حالة وجود بيانات وملاحظات ترى أنها هامةويجب اضافتها.

تاريخ الميلاد: ———————————————————

نوع الجنس: (ذكر) (أنثى)

المهنة: (طالب) (موظف) (عمل حر) (عاطل عن العمل) (مهنة أخرى حدد) ———————

مكان السكن: ———————————————————

المستوى التعليمي: ———————————————————

الوضع الاجتماعي: (أعزب) (متزوج) (مطلق) (أرمل)

الدخل: (أكثر من 500 دينار) (ما بين 200-499 دينار) (أقل من 200 دينار) لا يوجد

هل لديك بطاقة تعريف أو هوية الانتماء لثورة 17 فبراير؟

○ نعم

○ لا

○ إجابة أخرى:———————————————————

ما هي مساهمتك في ثورة 17 فبراير ؟

○ حمل السلاح في وجه الطاغية وقواته الغاشمة.

○ السجن من قبل النظام المباد بسبب تأييد ثوار 17 فبراير.

○ دعم الثوار ماديا (تبرعات مالية وعينية).

○ دعم الثوار معنويا. (رفع علم الاستقلال مثلا)

○ المشاركة في مظاهرات ضد نظام القذافي.

○ كل المشاركات السابقة الذكر.

○ إجابة أخرى:———————————————————

</div>

ما هي في راءيك مكونات ثورة 17 فبراير في إطار ليبيا الجديدة ؟ (ضع علامة "صح" على الفئة أو الفئات المناسبة في رأيك)

- كل من حمل السلاح في وجه الطاغية.
- كل من سجن بسبب تأييد ثوار 17 فبراير.
- كل من ساهم في دعم الثوار ماديا (تبرعات مالية وعينية).
- كل من ساهم في دعم الثوار معنويا. (الدفاع عن ثورة 17 فبراير أمام خصومها أو رفع علم الاستقلال مثلا)
- كل من شارك في مظاهرات ضد نظام القدافي.
- كل الفئات السابقة.
- إجابة أخرى:--

ما هي نوع المعاناة المترتبة على مشاركتك في ثورة 17 فبراير ؟

- شهيد أو شهداء من العائلة أو الأقارب.
- جريح أو جرحى من العائلة أو الأقارب.
- فقيد أو مفقودين من العائلة أو الأقارب.
- سجين.
- معاناة نفسية.
- كل الفئات السابقة.
- إجابة أخرى:--

ما هي مبررات مشاركتك في ثورة 17 فبراير ؟

- حب ليبيا كوطن.
- ظلم واستبداد نظام القدافي المباد.
- المعاناة الشخصية والعائلية من النظام المباد.
- تدمير ليبيا سياسيا واقتصاديا.
- كل الفئات السابقة.
- أسباب أخرى (أذكر) ------------------------------------

ما هي أنسب أنواع نظم الحكم الملائمة لليبيا الجديدة ؟

البرلماني مثل بريطانيا( ) الرئاسي مثل أمريكا( ) الجمعية الوطنية مثل سويسرا( ) البرلماني–الرئاسي مثل فرنس ( ) لا مبالي

هل يجب أن يطيع ثوار 17 فبراير السلطة السياسية (المتمثلة في المجلس الوطني الانتقالي والحكومة المؤقتة) في ليبيا الجديدة ؟

موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل يجب أن يحظى النظام السياسي في ليبيا الجديدة (المجلس الوطني الانتقالي والحكومة المؤقتة) بتأييد ثوار 17 فبراير؟

موافق بقوة( ) موافق( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل توافق على أن يستمد النظام السياسي في ليبيا الجديدة شرعيته من تأييد ثوار 17 فبراير ؟

موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) راف ( ) رافض بقوة

هل يمكن وصف أداء حكومة محمود جبريل خلال فترة ما قبل تحرير ليبيا بأنه يتمشى وطموحات ثورة 17 فبراير؟

موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

ما راءيك في تغليب الهوية الوطنية الليبية على الهوية العربية والأفريقية لليبيا الجديدة ؟

موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل تعتبر الفترة الانتقالية التي حددها الإعلان الدستوري (18 شهرا) كافية لتحقيق عملية التحول الديمقراطي في ليبيا الجديدة؟

موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل يجب أن تشكل الحكومة المؤقتة على أساس الكفاءة (حكومة تكنوقراط) بغض النظر عن مراعاة التوزيع الجغرافي العادلة؟

موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل توافق على إن ليبيا الجديدة تتسع لكل التوجهات السياسية ومختلف الطبقات والعرقيات ؟

( ) موافق بقوة ( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل تعتبر الديمقراطية التي ستطبقها ليبيا الجديدة نسخة كربونية لما هو مطبق في الدول الغربية ؟

( ) موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

ما موقفك من المبادئ والقيم التالية التي أشار إليها الإعلان الدستوري:

• دولة القانون والمؤسسات	( ) موافق بقوة	( ) موافق	( ) لا مبالي	( ) رافض	( ) رافض بقوة
• تحقيق رفاهية المواطن.	( ) موافق بقوة	( ) موافق	( ) لا مبالي	( ) رافض	( ) رافض بقوة
• الحرية والمساواة والعدالة	( ) موافق بقوة	( ) موافق	( ) لا مبالي	( ) رافض	( ) رافض بقوة
• الإسلام كمصدر للتشريع	( ) موافق بقوة	( ) موافق	( ) لا مبالي	( ) رافض	( ) رافض بقوة
• حرية المشاعر الدينية	( ) موافق بقوة	( ) موافق	( ) لا مبالي	( ) رافض	( ) رافض بقوة
• التعددية الحزبية.	( ) موافق بقوة	( ) موافق	( ) لا مبالي	( ) رافض	( ) رافض بقوة
• التداول السلمي للسلطة.	( ) موافق بقوة	( ) موافق	( ) لا مبالي	( ) رافض	( ) رافض بقوة
• الوفاء بالالتزامات الدولية	( ) موافق بقوة	( ) موافق	( ) لا مبالي	( ) رافض	( ) رافض بقوة
• دعم حقوق الإنسان.	( ) موافق بقوة	( ) موافق	( ) لا مبالي	( ) رافض	( ) رافض بقوة
• تعزيز الملكية الخاصة	( ) موافق بقوة	( ) موافق	( ) لا مبالي	( ) رافض	( ) رافض بقوة
• استقلالية القضاء.	( ) موافق بقوة	( ) موافق	( ) لا مبالي	( ) رافض	( ) رافض بقوة
• الفيدرالية "دويلات داخل دولة"	( ) موافق بقوة	( ) موافق	( ) لا مبالي	( ) رافض	( ) رافض بقوة

هل تؤيد الثقافة السياسية التقليدية التي تتسم بالسلبية المطلقة للمواطنين الليبيين تجاه ما يجري من أحداث سياسية في ليبيا الجديدة؟

( ) موافق بقوة ( ) مواف ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل تؤيد الثقافة السياسية التابعة التي تدعوا المواطنين الليبيين إلي تنفيذ سياسات الحكومة دون أن تحاول تصحيحها أو التأثير فيها ؟

( ) موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل تؤيد الثقافة السياسية المشاركة التي تدعوا إلي وجود علاقة تأثير وتأثر وتفاعل بين المواطنين والحكومة في ليبيا الجديدة؟

( ) موافق بقوة ( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل توافق على عبارة "إن ليبيا تعتبر قبيلة واحدة، وليست مجموعة قبائل متناحرة" ؟

( ) موافق بقوة ( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل نجح في راءيك القدافي في تحريضه للقبائل الليبية ضد بعضها البعض أثناء قيام ثورة 17 فبراير ؟

( ) موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل في راءيك ستنجح عملية المصالحة الوطنية في إطار ليبيا الجديدة ؟

( ) موافق بقوة ( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل توافق على تبني اللغة الأمازيغية رسميا (إلي جانب اللغة العربية) من قبل دستور ليبيا الجديدة؟

( ) موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل ساهمت الطبقة الوسطى (متعلمين ومتوسطي الدخل) في إنجاح ثورة 17 فبراير ؟

( ) موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل توافق على المصالحة الوطنية مع أخر المناطق الموافقة للقدافي في إطار ليبيا الجديدة، مثل سرت وبني وليد ؟

( ) موافق بقوة ( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

ما هي المشاعر التي تكنها أو تحملها تجاه أنصار ورموز القدافي الحاليين في إطار ليبيا الجديدة ؟

( ) متسامح بقوة ( ) متسامح ( ) لا مبالي ( ) معادي ( ) معادي بقوة

ما راءيك في سياسة نزح سلاح الثوار وتخيرهم بين عملية الانضمام إلي الجيش الوطني أو الأمن الوطني ؟

( ) موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل توافق على سياسة شراء الأسلحة من الثوار(بأسعار مغرية) وغيرهم بهدف تحقيق السلم والأمن في ليبيا الجديدة ؟

( ) موافق بقوة ( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل تعاملت الحكومة المؤقتة برئاسة محمود جبريل مع إشكالية معالجة جرحى ثورة 17 فبراير بنجاح؟

( ) موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل تعتبر عملية أعمار ليبيا من أكثر التحديات التي ستواجه الحكومة المؤقتة والمجلس الوطني الانتقالي ؟

( ) موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل تعتبر سياسة تحسين الخدمات، خاصة في مجالات الصحة والتعليم والسكن، من أبرز التحديات التي ستواجه ليبيا الجديدة؟

( ) موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل تعتبر سياسة المصالحة الوطنية وبناء ليبيا الجديدة بمثابة الجهاد الأكبر بالنسبة لكل الليبيين ؟

( ) موافق بقوة ( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل يجب التعامل مع المشاكل البيئية (التلوث ودمار القدافي للبيئة) من أولويات السياسة العامة في ليبيا الجديدة ؟

( ) موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل تحتاج ليبيا الجديدة أن تعيد النظر في مواقف البلدان الأفريقية من ثورة 17 فبراير ؟

( ) موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

هل تحتاج ليبيا الجديدة إلي تقييم موقفها من بعض الدول (مثل روسيا والصين والجزائر) التي لم تعترف بالمجلس الوطني مبكرا؟

( ) موافق بقوة( ) موافق ( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض   ( ) رافض بقوة

هل توافق على منح دول التحالف (مثل فرنسا، قطر وبريطانيا) ألأولوية في إطار السياسة العامة لليبيا الجديدة ؟

( ) موافق بقوة ( ) موافق( ) لا مبالي ( ) رافض ( ) رافض بقوة

انتهت الأسئلة مع فائق الشكر والتقدير والاحترام